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I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the interpretations of and changes relating to oil,
gas, and mineral law in Texas from December 1, 2016, through November
30, 2017. The cases examined include decisions of state and federal courts
* Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
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in the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1
II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES2
A. LIGHTNING OIL CO. V. ANADARKO E&P ONSHORE, LLC
Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC3 held that the sur-
face owner has the right to locate a well on the surface and to drill
through the earth beneath the surface to an adjacent tract when the min-
eral estate and surface estate have been severed. The fee owner severed
the surface and mineral estate in the Briscoe Ranch. Lightning Oil Co.
(Lightning), as lessee, acquired from the mineral owner a lease for oil and
gas under the Briscoe Ranch. Anadarko E & P Onshore, LLC
(Anadarko) entered into a Surface Use and Subsurface Easement Agree-
ment with Briscoe Ranch to site wells on the Briscoe Ranch and to drill
through the earth under the Briscoe Ranch to open wells that bottomed
on Anadarko’s adjacent leasehold acreage. Lightning sued Anadarko for
trespass and tortious interference with Lightning’s lease.4
. . . Lightning’s claims for both trespass and tortious interference
with contract turn on whether a lessee’s rights in the mineral estate
include the right to preclude a surface owner or an adjacent lessee’s
activities that are not intended to capture the lessee’s minerals, but
rather are intended only to traverse, or bore through, the formations
in which the lessee’s minerals are located.5
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included. Page limitations of this publication required the omission of some cases of
interest. The facts in the cases are sometimes simplified to focus on the legal principles.
2. Other cases dealing with title and conveyancing issues include the following: Webb
v. Martinez, No. 04-16-00042-CV, 2016 WL 7234044 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 14,
2016, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (limitations on deed reformation); Whitfield v. Ondrej, No. 04-
15-00052-CV, 2016 WL 7383823 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 21, 2016, no. pet.) (mem.
op.) (limitations on deed reformation); Tanya L. McCabe Trust v. Ranger Energy LLC, 531
S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (correction—instrument
statute); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P., 528 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2017, no. pet.) (railroad right-of-way or fee); Reed v. Maltsberger/Storey Ranch,
LLC, 534 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (mineral/royalty
distinction); Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. 2017) (general granting clause); Cabot
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Newfield Expl. Mid-Continent, Inc., No. 07-16-00125-CV, 2017 WL
2622773 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 13, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (statute of frauds and
proration unit); Jarzombek v. Ramsey, 534 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet.
denied) (statute of limitations on deed reformation); Boothe v. Green, 534 S.W.3d 93 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi June 22, 2017, pet. filed) (partial ademption pro tanto); In re
Houston Bluebonnet, L.L.C., No. 16-34850, 2017 WL 4117331 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 15,
2017) (reservation of net proceeds interest); Hahn v. Gips, No. 13-16-00336-CV, 2017 WL
4837877 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 26, 2017, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (partition deeds);
Dragon v. Trial, No. 04-16-00758-CV, 2017 WL 5162180 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 8,
2017, pet. superseded on rehearing, 2018 WL 771908) (mem. op.) (estoppel by deed);
Bradley v. Shaffer, 535 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 30, 2017, no pet.) (rule
against perpetuities and spendthrift clause).
3. 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017).
4. Id. at 43.
5. Id. at 46.
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The Texas Supreme Court recognized that every unauthorized entry upon
land of another is a trespass, but noted that ownership of property does
not necessarily include the right to exclude every invasion or interfer-
ence.6 “[P]roperty does not refer to a thing but rather to the rights be-
tween a person and a thing.”7 “Consequently, a trespass is not just an
unauthorized interference with physical property, but also is an unautho-
rized interference with one of the rights the property owner holds.”8
The supreme court then analyzed the relationship between the surface
estate and the mineral estate. The surface overlying a leased mineral es-
tate is the surface owner’s property, and those ownership rights include
the geological structures beneath the surface.9 “Although the surface
owner retains ownership and control of the subsurface materials, a min-
eral lessee owns a property interest—a determinable fee—in the oil and
gas in place in the subsurface materials.”10 Lightning pointed out that, in
this case, Anadarko would clearly extract some of Lightning’s minerals
(from the wellbore) and put permanent structures in place (surface loca-
tions and casing) that could interfere with Lightning’s dominant mineral
estate and its exclusive right to produce the minerals.11
The materials extracted from the wellbore would include about a
dump-truck load of material (and inevitably some oil and gas) out of the
producing Escondido formation, which is about 200–875 feet thick.12 The
court applied a balancing test13 and held, on the basis of public policy,
that the loss Lightning would face was not a sufficient injury to support a
claim for trespass.14 The supreme court relied upon “the longstanding
policy of this state to encourage maximum recovery of minerals and to
minimize waste.”15 It is unclear from the opinion whether there was some
evidence in the case of the efficacy of horizontal drilling originating on
off-site surface locations, or if the court simply relied upon secondary
sources to reach that conclusion.16
To resolve Lightning’s claim of interference, the supreme court first
reviewed the nature of the mineral estate. There are five “rights,” and the
one at issue here is the right to develop.17
[T]he rights conveyed by a mineral lease generally encompass the
rights to explore, obtain, produce, and possess the minerals subject
6. Id.
7. Id. at 49 (quoting Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 372, 382–83
(Tex. 2012)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 46 (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933, 934–38
(Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
10. Id. at 47 (citing Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 47 n.2.
13. Id. (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. 1974)).
14. Id. at 51.
15. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI § 59(a); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 85.045 (West
2011); West, 508 S.W.2d at 816)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 49.
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to the lease; they do not include the right to possess the specific place
or space where the minerals are located. Thus, an unauthorized in-
terference with the place where the minerals are located constitutes a
trespass as to the mineral estate only if the interference infringes on
the mineral lessee’s ability to exercise its rights.18
The supreme court held that Lightning’s claims of interference were mere
speculation. Whatever future development might occur would be gov-
erned by the rules and regulations of the Railroad Commission and
would be further limited by Anadarko’s rights being no greater than
those of the surface owner.19 The supreme court specifically pointed to
the accommodation doctrine and its belief that the doctrine has a broad
application.20
The supreme court expanded on the accommodation doctrine after first
noting that “because Anadarko is the surface owner’s assignee, its activi-
ties are a surface use for accommodation doctrine purposes.”21 “Light-
ning’s argument is essentially that it should have the right to prevent any
surface or subsurface use that might later interfere with its plans. Such a
decision would render the mineral estate absolutely dominant and signifi-
cantly alter the balance achieved through the flexible nature of the ac-
commodation doctrine.”22 This obviously extends the accommodation
doctrine beneath the surface and reaches uses other than use of the
surface.
The supreme court expressly based its opinion on the respective rights
of the surface estate and the mineral estate.23 It should be noted that this
case involved the rights that follow a severed surface estate, which does
not address the additional complexity of a lessor/lessee relationship. That
is, many lease forms grant the “exclusive” right to drill, and that provi-
sion—or other express or implied covenants in the lease—may further
restrict the rights of the surface owner who is also a lessor.
The significance of the case is the holding that the surface owner has
the right to locate a well on the surface and to drill through the earth
beneath the surface to an adjacent tract when the mineral estate and sur-
face estate have been severed.
B. XTO ENERGY INC. V. GOODWIN
XTO Energy Inc. v. Goodwin24 held that there is no depth limitation
on a cause of action for a subsurface trespass. Goodwin owned at least
some of the minerals in three small tracts that were included in a lease
18. Id.
19. Id. at 49–50.
20. Id. (citing Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 498 S.W.3d 53, 63 (Tex.
2016)).
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id. (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1971)).
23. Id.
24. No. 12-16-00068-CV, 2017 WL 4675136 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 18, 2017, pet.
filed).
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eventually acquired by XTO. The opinion does not discuss Goodwin’s
surface rights, but apparently Goodwin owned at least some surface
rights. There was an underpayment of bonus on the lease, and at all rele-
vant times Goodwin contended the lease was void. XTO acknowledged a
mistake in payment of bonus, but XTO disagreed that the lease was void.
In 2010, XTO formed the “North Unit,” purported to pool Goodwin’s
lease, and completed a unit well. In 2012, Goodwin began receiving royal-
ties on the North Unit, which Goodwin kept. At about the same time,
XTO formed the “South Unit,” including lands adjacent to and immedi-
ately south of the North Unit. Goodwin’s land was right on the south
boundary of the North Unit. XTO drilled the vertical leg of its horizontal
well on the South Unit very close to the boundary line between the units.
On April 25, 2012, the South Unit well bit was within 60 feet of the
boundary. On May 5, the path of the wellbore had entered Goodwin’s
tract at a depth of 10,000 feet and bored 126 feet through Goodwin’s
tract. On May 8, about halfway through the ultimate total trespass path
and after casing had been set, XTO decided to just keep going. The well
exited Goodwin’s tract at a depth of 13,200 feet after trespassing for 2,900
linear feet.25
Goodwin refused to grant a subsurface easement to XTO. XTO sus-
pended Goodwin’s royalties on the North Unit, alleging Goodwin had
been overpaid.26 The well was drilled to total depth and perforated—but
never produced—while XTO awaited the outcome of the dispute.27
During the subsequent litigation, Goodwin obtained a partial summary
judgment that voided the lease for underpayment of lease bonus.28 The
Tyler Court of Appeals did not review the trial court’s ruling on the
lease.29 Therefore, for purposes of all the other issues in the opinion,
Goodwin was effectively unleased. After obtaining the partial summary
judgment voiding the lease, Goodwin tried the case to a jury on trespass,
bad faith trespass, conversion, fraud, and bad faith pooling. The jury
found for Goodwin on all claims, but also found that XTO did not act
with malice or commit fraud. Goodwin accepted the damages awarded
for trespass and bad faith pooling, totaling over $2,000,000.30 There was
also a directed verdict that Goodwin was not obligated to repay XTO the
$386,000 in royalties Goodwin received and retained for production at-
tributable to the North Unit.31
XTO contended that “Goodwin did not have a legally protected own-
ership interest in the subsurface two miles below the surface of his prop-
erty sufficient to support a trespass cause of action.”32 Relying on Coastal
25. Id. at *1.
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id. at *6.
28. Id. at *2.
29. Id. at *13 n.9.
30. Id. at *2.
31. Id. at *11.
32. Id. at *2.
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v. Garza,33 XTO argued that a deep subsurface intrusion alone will not
support a trespass claim.34 One of the issues in Coastal v. Garza was
whether “the incursion of hydraulic fracturing fluid and proppants into
another’s land two miles below the surface constitutes an actionable tres-
pass.”35 The Texas Supreme Court in Garza did not decide that issue, but
recited in dicta that the ad coelom et ad infernos doctrine (ownership in
land extends to the sky above and down to the center of the earth) “has
no place in the modern world.”36 In Environmental Processing v. FPL
Farming,37 one issue before the Texas Supreme Court was whether the
subsurface migration of wastewater onto an adjacent property would sup-
port a cause of action for deep subsurface trespass. Again the supreme
court decided the case on other grounds and did not comment on the ad
coelom statement in Garza.38 The court of appeals also cited Lightning v.
Anadarko39 and Humble v. West40 for the holdings that the surface owner
owns and controls the non-mineral subsurface and is allowed to permit
drilling through the mineral estate to access production on another
tract.41 None of these supreme court cases actually impose a depth limita-
tion on actionable subsurface trespass.42 Thus, the court of appeals re-
jected XTO’s arguments, holding that “[r]egardless of the depth that
XTO’s wellbore entered or exited Goodwin’s subsurface, the approxi-
mately 2,900 linear feet the cased wellbore intruded into Goodwin’s prop-
erty constitutes an actionable trespass.”43
Goodwin then lost his cause of action for subsurface trespass by failing
to prove damages. XTO argued generally that Goodwin’s damage model
was focused more on the value of the well to XTO rather than the tradi-
tional damage model for permanent injury to land.44 However, the court
of appeals focused more on Goodwin’s expert testimony and held that
there was no evidence on damages because the basis of the expert’s opin-
ion was too unreliable.45 The expert’s damage model was: (Trespass Feet/
Wellbore Feet) x Value of Well = Damages. For the value of the well, the
expert used XTO’s valuation forecast in its Securities and Exchange
Commission filing. There was no evidence on how XTO arrived at its
forecast, so the court found the valuation unreliable.46 Further, there was
no evidence of actual production from the well, and XTO does not have
33. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
34. Goodwin, 2017 WL 4675136, at *3.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 11).
37. 457 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Tex. 2015).
38. Goodwin, 2007 WL 4675136, at *3.
39. 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017).
40. 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974).
41. Goodwin, 2017 WL 4675136, at *3–4 (citing Lightning, 520 S.W.3d at 46; West 508
S.W.2d at 815)).
42. Id. at *4.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at *7.
46. Id. at *6.
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the legal right to transport production through the wellbore without ob-
taining an easement from Goodwin (apparently Goodwin owns the sur-
face).47 Therefore, the well had no value.48
After losing his trespass claim, Goodwin also lost on bad faith pooling.
The court of appeals held that the implied duty to pool in good faith
originates with the lease, and if there is no lease, there is no duty.49 “Bad
faith pooling is the failure of a lessee to act fairly and in good faith as to a
lessor.”50 “To be liable for bad faith pooling, an operator must have the
contractual authority to pool before it can breach the implied duty of
fairness and good faith as to non-producing tracts in the exercise of its
pooling powers.”51 Goodwin argued Wagner & Brown v. Sheppard52
(which held a pooled unit did not expire when a lease in the pool expired
because the lands were pooled) was controlling.53 The court found Wag-
ner & Brown did not apply because the lease in that case was in effect at
the time the operator created the unit whereas here there was never a
valid lease.54
XTO counterclaimed to recover $386,000 it paid to Goodwin as unit
royalties on the North Unit.55 The producing well was a unit well, not a
lease well. Given that Goodwin sought to declare the lease void and that
the lease was declared void by the court, XTO contended that Goodwin
was contractually bound by implied covenants in the lease and contrac-
tual provisions in the division order to return the royalties, or alterna-
tively, Goodwin was equitably bound to return the royalties as money
had and received to prevent Goodwin from being unjustly enriched.56
There was no evidence as to who would receive the benefit of reimburse-
ment of the royalties Goodwin received, so the court simply presumed
XTO would receive the benefit.57 The court then relied upon Gavenda v.
Strata on division orders, which it says holds that operators cannot rely
upon division orders to profit from their own errors in preparing division
orders.58 This is probably a fundamental misunderstanding of Gavenda.
Gavenda holds that the underpaid owner who signed a division order
must seek recovery against the overpaid owner, not the operator; but if
the overpaid owner is the operator, the division order will not protect the
operator from accounting to the underpaid owner for the operator’s
share of the overpayment. Goodwin was not an underpaid owner.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *7.
49. Id. at *8.
50. Id. (citing Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999)).
51. Id.
52. 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008).
53. Goodwin, 2017 WL 4675136, at *8.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *11.
56. Id. at *12.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *11–12 (citing Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex.
1986)).
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The court then conceded that when the lease was voided, Goodwin was
not entitled to royalties on the North Unit, and therefore Goodwin “has
been unjustly enriched by the receipt of the royalties from that [North
Unit well].”59 This would seem to justify an equitable recovery by XTO
under XTO’s theory of money had and received. However, the court af-
firmed the windfall to Goodwin based on the defense of voluntary pay-
ment. “Money voluntarily paid on a claim of right, with full knowledge of
all the facts, in the absence of fraud, deception, duress, or compulsion,
cannot be recovered merely because the party at the time of the payment
was ignorant of or mistook the law as to his liability.”60 The voluntary
payment rule upholds the public policy in favor of “protecting the finality
of payments,” and the court here relied upon that rule to deny XTO’s
counterclaim.61
The significance of this case is the holding that there is no depth limita-
tion on the surface owner’s rights in the subsurface. The holding as to
division orders and payments appears to misinterpret precedent and too
severe by limiting the efficacy of division orders through the application
of the voluntary payment rule.
C. VIRTEX OPERATING CO., INC. V. BAUERLE
VirTex Operating Co. v. Bauerle62 held that an oil and gas lessee could
not install overhead power lines to producing wells under the accommo-
dation doctrine. Bauerle owned the surface estate of an 8,500-acre ranch
upon which it ran a commercial hunting business and cattle operation.
VirTex acquired an oil and gas lease on the ranch covering about 3,000
acres and drilled nine oil wells. The pump jacks were running on tempo-
rary portable generators.63 VirTex proposed drilling forty-five more
wells.64 VirTex asked Bauerle to grant to VirTex an easement for VirTex
to install a gridwork of overhead power lines on the lease to reach the
existing and proposed wells. Bauerle refused, insisting that such overhead
power lines would substantially impair the airspace of the property, which
included use of helicopters for game management and other operations.
Hunting leases were the main source of income for the ranch, and the
lessee hunters used helicopters for extreme flying, five feet off the
ground, to herd the deer into areas where they could be captured with a
net gun. Bauerle asked VirTex to halt construction plans, and VirTex
agreed. Bauerle then filed a declaratory judgment action against VirTex,
seeking judgment that the proposed use would substantially impair
59. Id. at *13.
60. Id. at *11 (citing BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex.
2005)).
61. Id.
62. No. 04-16-00549-CV, 2017 WL 5162546 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 8, 2017,
pet. filed) (mem. op.).
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *8.
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Bauerle’s pre-existing use of the surface and the airspace.65
The issue was whether the accommodation doctrine prevented VirTex
from installing the overhead power lines. Under the accommodation doc-
trine, if the mineral owner or lessee has only one method for developing
and producing minerals, then that method may be used regardless of
whether it precludes or substantially impairs the surface estate owner’s
existing use of the surface.66 However, if the mineral owner has reasona-
ble alternative uses of the surface, one of which permits the surface estate
owner to continue to use the surface in the manner intended, then the
mineral owner must use the alternative method.67 The mineral owner’s
absolute right to use the surface is preserved if there is only one way to
produce the minerals.68 The accommodation doctrine and the burden of
proof is now defined as follows:
[T]he surface owner has the burden to prove that (1) the lessee’s use
completely precludes or substantially impairs the existing use, and
(2) there is no reasonable alternative method available to the surface
owner by which the existing use can be continued. If the surface
owner carries that burden, he must further prove that given the par-
ticular circumstances, there are alternative reasonable, customary,
and industry-accepted methods available to the lessee which will al-
low recovery of the minerals and also allow the surface owner to
continue the existing use.69
In this case, under the first prong of the accommodation doctrine, the
San Antonio Court of Appeals examined whether the proposed power
line grid would completely preclude or substantially impair leasing to he-
licopter hunters.70 It held that it would.71 The court found the testimony
of the lessee hunter helicopter pilots to be sufficient evidence that the
installation of the power lines would create “a very dangerous situation,”
and that the testimony was legally and factually sufficient to prove the
power lines would substantially impair the existing use of helicopters over
the airspace of the property.72 Further, the court held that the impair-
ment need not actually be in place (no overhead lines were in place) for
the impairment to be considered under the accommodation doctrine.73
The second prong of the accommodation doctrine requires an inquiry
as to whether any reasonable alternative method exists for Bauerle to
continue its existing surface use. The court of appeals found that there
65. Id. at *1–2.
66. Id. at *4 (quoting Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248–49 (Tex.
2013)).
67. Id. (citing Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248–49).
68. Id. (citing Tex. Genco, L.P. v. Valence Operating Co., 187 S.W.3d 121, 121–23
(Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied)).
69. Id. (quoting Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 498 S.W.3d 53, 62–63
(Tex. 2016)).
70. Id. at *5.
71. Id. at *7.
72. Id. at *5.
73. Id. at *6.
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was not.74 Testimony produced by Bauerle established that the proposed
alternatives to helicopters were so inconvenient, expensive, and inade-
quate so as to make any proposed alternative method (e.g., use of four-
wheelers) unreasonable.75 In summary, the lessee helicopter hunters tes-
tified that installing power lines would make it unsafe to fly, and if they
could not fly, they would not lease.76 VirTex argued the evidence merely
showed other leases would be less economically beneficial to the surface
owner. VirTex’s argument relied on Merriman v. XTO Energy Inc.,77
which held that the surface owner could be required to use other corrals
and pens to conduct its cattle operations, even though it would be more
expensive and inconvenient for the surface owner. The court of appeals in
VirTex rejected a similar argument by the mineral owner because the he-
licopter hunters had no reasonable alternative.78
The court then turned to whether Bauerle had proven that an alterna-
tive, reasonable, customary, and industry-accepted method was available
to VirTex to recover the minerals.79 The court concluded there was an
alternative for VirTex. VirTex presented some evidence that use of natu-
ral gas would require an easement across an adjoining tract and that there
was no evidence that the easement could be obtained, that gas would cost
$200–$300 more per well per month, and that burying electric powerlines
would be even more expensive.80 The court ruled there was “more than a
mere scintilla of evidence” that burying the power lines or using natural
gas were reasonable, industry-accepted alternative methods that VirTex
could use, and that while the available alternative may not be the pre-
ferred or most economical method, under the accommodation doctrine, it
need only be shown to be a reasonable and industry-accepted
alternative.81
The opinion seems to assume that the “reasonable” industry alternative
is a technology question, without any consideration of economics. There
is nothing in the opinion aggregating, comparing, or weighing the relative
economic consequences for the surface owner and the mineral owner.
The accommodation doctrine is not yet fully developed. Is the surface
“use” generic or specific? What weight should be given to “first” use?
Should there be a cost/benefit balancing test? Moving away from domi-
nant mineral estate to accommodation inevitably means more fact
questions.
There was also a procedural point of some significance. VirTex con-
tended that the awarding of attorney’s fees to Bauerle under the Uniform
74. Id. at *8.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *7.
77. Id. at *8 (citing Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 249–50 (Tex.
2013)).
78. Id. at *7–8.
79. Id. at *8.
80. Id. at *9–10.
81. Id. at *10.
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Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) was in error. Under Section 37.009
of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, “a court may award costs
and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees in a proceeding brought
under the UDJA.”82 However, a party cannot use the UDJA as a vehicle
to obtain otherwise impermissible attorney’s fees.83 VirTex argued that
Bauerle’s request for relief was effectively injunctive—as opposed to de-
claratory—and thus outside the scope of the UDJA. In support, it argued
that every other accommodation doctrine case was a case of injunctive
relief. However, the court held that, in this case, Bauerle properly re-
quested declaratory relief instead of injunctive relief because VirTex had
already voluntarily ceased installation of the power lines. Bauerle cor-
rectly sought a declaratory judgment action because there was “an active
dispute with regard to their rights and obligations” and there was nothing
in the record to suggest Bauerle sought a declaration solely for the pur-
pose of recovering its attorney’s fees.84
The significance of the case is limited because it is essentially an evi-
dence case, and perhaps that is why it is a memorandum opinion. It fo-
cuses on whether the lessee helicopter hunters have an alternative use,
rather than on whether the land can be leased to others for hunting,
which could be merely inconvenient or less economically beneficial to the
surface owner than the existing method of use.85 That is, was the “existing
use” a hunting lease, or a helicopter hunting lease?
D. WENSKE V. EALY
Wenske v. Ealy86 held that an outstanding non-participating royalty in-
terest (NPRI) burdened Grantor and Grantee proportionately, because
nothing within the four corners of the deed indicated the parties intended
that the NPRI would burden only Grantee. Perhaps more importantly,
the case strongly restates the Texas Supreme Court’s preference for find-
ing intent without resorting to rules of construction. There was an out-
standing 1/4th NPRI burden on the property. In the granting clause of the
warranty deed, Grantor conveyed all of the property to Grantee “subject
to the Reservations from Conveyance and the Exceptions to Conveyance
and Warranty.”87 The “Reservations from Conveyance” clause reserved
3/8ths of the minerals to Grantor. The “Exceptions to Conveyance and
Warranty” clause expressly identified the outstanding NPRI.88 Grantor
contended that Grantor’s interest was not burdened by the NPRI.
Grantee contended that the NPRI burdened Grantor and Grantee pro-
82. Id. at *11 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (West 2008)).
83. Id. (quoting Tanglewood Homes Ass’n v. Feldman, 436 S.W.3d 48, 69 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2013).
86. 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017).
87. Id. at 793.
88. Id.
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portionately.89 The issue was whether the “Exceptions to Conveyance
and Warranty” clause was merely a limitation on the warranty.90
Grantor relied upon Bass v. Harper.91 In Bass, there was an outstand-
ing 6/14ths interest, and Grantor conveyed 1/2 of the minerals (7/14ths),
subject to the outstanding 6/14ths, which the court held resulted in 1/14th
to Grantee.92 This case, like Bass, centered upon the effect to be given to
a subject-to clause. While the supreme court in Wenske did not overrule
Bass, it held that Bass is limited to the specific language in the deed at
issue in Bass.93 “The instrument in question does not relate the outstand-
ing mineral royalty interests to the warranty. It could have done so, but it
is tied specifically to the grant.”94
The resolution of this case turned largely upon the meaning of the sub-
ject-to clause. The principal function of a subject-to clause in a deed is to
protect a Grantor against a claim for breach of warranty when some min-
eral interest is already outstanding. Use of a subject-to clause to perform
some other function is likely to introduce an element of ambiguity.95 The
supreme court cited to an 1880’s case from Pennsylvania as authority for
its reasoning on intent. “We think ‘[t]he best construction is that which is
made by viewing the subject of the contract as the mass of mankind
would view it; for . . . it may be safely assumed that such was the aspect in
which the parties themselves viewed it.’”96 Perhaps the court could have
cited William of Ockham’s razor: when presented with competing hypo-
thetical answers to a problem, one should select the one that makes the
fewest assumptions.97 Apparently we need not examine the entire “mass
of mankind,” because the supreme court also said “[t]he principles of oil-
and-gas law inform our interpretation. Generally, ‘the conveyance of an
interest in the minerals in place carries with it by operation of law the
right to a corresponding interest in the royalty.’”98 Giving the deed’s
words their plain meaning, the supreme court could not “construe [the
deed] to say the parties intended the [Grantee’s] interest to be the sole
interest subject to the NPRI.”99
The supreme court obviously intends this opinion to be important in
articulating how intent is to be determined. The supreme court acknowl-
edges the trend of its decisions to reject rigid, mechanical rules of deed
construction, and to rely upon four-corners deed construction to ascertain
89. Id. at 793–94.
90. Id. at 797.
91. 441 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1969).
92. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 794.
93. Id. at 795.
94. Id. (quoting Bass, 441 S.W.2d at 827).
95. Id. at 796.
96. Id. at 797 (quoting Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43 (1882) (citation
omitted)).
97. The razor is widely attributed to the Franciscan friar, William of Ockham, who
lived in the 14th Century.
98. Id. (quoting Woods v. Sims, 273 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Tex. 1954)).
99. Id.
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the intent of the parties. The supreme court repeatedly states that it re-
jects rules of construction, “magic words,” and giving primacy to particu-
lar clauses.100 The supreme court also expressly stated that its decision in
this case should not be construed as establishing a new default rule that
conveyances subject to an outstanding NPRI will result in the NPRI be-
ing borne proportionately.101 The supreme court recited that its decision
“does not vitiate the established background principles of oil-and-gas law
nor does it open for debate the meaning of clearly defined terms in every
deed dispute.”102 The supreme court suggested that “[g]oing forward,
drafters of deeds should endeavor to plainly express the contracting par-
ties’ intent within the four corners of the instrument they execute.”103
The supreme court said “[t]he deed here is not a model of clarity. But
read in its entirety, we see only one reasonable interpretation of its
words.”104
Nevertheless, this 5–4 decision prompted a strong dissent. The dissent
contended the interest granted to [Grantee] was the only interest that was
“subject to” the exception for [the NPRI] interest.105 The interest con-
veyed was the only interest made “subject to” anything, and it was made
subject to the NPRI, not 5/8ths of the NPRI.106 The supreme court should
not have used its “own intuition of what the parties probably meant—
which of course will usually correspond to our own views of what the
parties should have meant.”107
The dissent also pushes back on abandoning all rules of interpretation.
“[W]hen this court adopts a rule of interpretation, parties who draft
agreements will reasonably rely on that rule when deciding how to ex-
press their intent. Our decisions can imbue words with ‘magic,’ and draft-
ers rely on that talismanic power to create certainty in their
instruments.”108 The dissent then cited and discussed in detail Duhig and
its progeny as authority for construing the deed for Grantor.109 The dis-
sent found Bass to be helpful, if not controlling.110
The significance of this case is the holding that, although the intent of
the parties—rather than mechanical rules or “magic words”—governs an
unambiguous conveyance, a subject-to clause is generally intended to
limit the warranty and will not be construed to do more, unless clearly
expressed in the deed. However, the supreme court should not use its
100. Id. at 792, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798.




105. Id. at 801 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 803.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 803–04.
109. Id. at 807–16 (citing Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.
1940); Benge v. Scharbauer, 259 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1953); Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645
(1957); Selman v. Bristow, 406 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1966); Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825
(Tex. 1969)).
110. Id. at 816.
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“own intuition of what the parties probably meant—which of course will
usually correspond to our own views of what the parties should have
meant. . . .”
III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES111
A. BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. V. LADDEX, LTD.
BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd.112 held that the trial court
erred in submitting a jury charge question that limited the jury’s consider-
ation to a specific period of time in determining whether a mineral lease
had ceased to produce in paying quantities. BP America Production
Company (BP) was the lessee of a 1971 base lease in Roberts County,
Texas. The only well on the lease produced steadily beyond the expiration
of its five-year primary term until August 2005, when production slowed
significantly for fifteen months. In November 2006, the well returned to
pre-slowdown levels. In March 2007, the lessors signed a top lease with
Laddex, Ltd. (Laddex). The top lease provided that it would vest upon
the filing of releases by all existing lease owners or the entry of a final,
non-appealable judgment of lease termination. Laddex then sued BP,
seeking to terminate BP’s lease on the grounds that it had failed to pro-
duce in paying quantities in 2005 and 2006.113
In Clifton v. Koontz,114 the Texas Supreme Court set forth a two-prong
test to determine if a well is producing in paying quantities: (1) whether
the well pays a profit, even small, over operating expenses; and (2) if not,
whether, under all the relevant circumstances a reasonably prudent oper-
ator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not merely for specu-
lation, continue to operate the well as it had been operated.115 In Laddex,
the jury charge posed two questions for each prong of the Clifton v.
Koontz test, but the first question limited the jury’s consideration to the
fifteen-month period of slowed production.116 The jury found that BP’s
well failed to produce in paying quantities during the fifteen month pe-
111. Other cases dealing with lease and leasing issues include the following: Richardson
v. Mills, 514 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, pet. denied) (construction of a release of
oil and gas lease); Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. Texas Crude Energy, LLC, 516 S.W.3d
638 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, pet. granted) (post-production costs on overriding
royalty); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Ramirez, 534 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017,
pet. filed) (conveyance and leasing of contingent remainder interests); Mzyk v. Murphy
Expl. & Prod. Co.-USA, No. 04–15–00677–CV, 2017 WL 2797479 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio June 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (offset well obligation); Hardin-Simmons Univ.
v. Hunt Cimarron Ltd., No. 07-15-00303-CV, 2017 WL 3197920 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July
25, 2017, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (Pugh clause and retained acreage clause); Spellmann v.
Love, 534 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, pet. denied) (termination of term
NPRI); Apache Deepwater, LLC v. Double Eagle Dev., LLC, No. 08-16-00038-CV, 2017
WL 3614298 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 23, 2017, pet. filed) (retained acreage clause).
112. 513 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2017).
113. Id. at 478.
114. 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
115. Id. at 691.
116. Laddex, 513 S.W.3d at 482–83 (The jury was asked “From August 1, 2005 to Octo-
ber 31, 2006, did the Mahler D-2 Well fail to produce in paying quantities?”).
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riod and that a reasonably prudent operator would not have continued to
operate the well as it had been operated before.117 Based on these find-
ings, the trial court entered judgment for Laddex, declaring BP’s lease
terminated.118 The issues were whether Laddex had standing to sue and
whether the charge was properly submitted.119
BP’s standing argument was based on BP’s contention that Laddex’s
top lease was void as a perpetuity, which deprived Laddex of standing to
bring the lawsuit and the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.120 The
rule provides that “no interest is valid unless it must vest, if at all, within
twenty-one years after the death of some life or lives in being at the time
of the conveyance,” and “it is void if by any possible contingency the
grant or devise could violate the Rule.”121 The Laddex top lease stated:
“This Lease is intended to and does include and vest in Lessee any and all
remainder and reversionary interest and after-acquired title of Lessor in
the Leased Premises upon expiration of any prior oil, gas or mineral lease
. . . .”122 BP argued that this language delayed the vesting of a reversion-
ary interest in Laddex until the date the BP lease expired, which could
fall beyond the time allowed by the rule against perpetuities. Conversely,
Laddex argued that the language presently vested in Laddex the lessor’s
possibility of reverter.123
Noting that the Laddex top lease “is not a model of clarity,”124 the
Texas Supreme Court concluded that the interpretations of both sides
were plausible.125 Because both interpretations were plausible, the su-
preme court accepted Laddex’s interpretation, invoking the rule of con-
struction that “where an instrument is equally open to two constructions,
the one will be accepted which renders it valid rather than void, it being
assumed that a Grantor would intend to create a legal instrument rather
than one which is illegal.”126
The supreme court then turned to the production in paying quantities
issue and the jury charge’s limitation of time to the fifteen months of
slowed production. The supreme court noted that in Clifton, it empha-
sized that “there can be no limit as to the time, whether it be days, weeks,
or months, to be taken into consideration in determining the question of
whether paying production from the lease has ceased.”127 Thus, the su-
preme court held that, while the parties may argue time in relation to
production in paying quantities, “the charge may not ask or instruct the
117. Id. at 483–84.
118. Id. at 484.
119. Id. at 479.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 479–80 (quoting Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982)).
122. Id. at 481.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 482.
126. Id. (quoting Kelly v. Womack, 268 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1954)).
127. Id. (quoting Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690 (1959)).
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jury about a specific period without unduly influencing the jury.”128
Therefore, the supreme court held that the jury charge did not permit the
jury to act as fact-finder.129 Because both BP and Laddex presented evi-
dence about the well’s production and profitability that could have sup-
ported a verdict in either BP’s or Laddex’s favor, remand was
appropriate.130
This case confirms that although the parties are free to present evi-
dence and argue what is a reasonable period of time for determining pro-
duction in paying quantities, the trial court cannot define that period of
time in the charge without unduly influencing the jury.
B. BP AMERICA PRODUCTION CO. V. RED DEER RESOURCES, LLC
BP America Production Co. v. Red Deer Resources, LLC131 held that
the critical date for determining whether a well was capable of producing
in paying quantities under a shut-in royalty clause was the last day gas
was sold or used. BP owned an oil and gas lease in the secondary term
held by a single, sporadically producing, marginal gas well. Red Deer top
leased BP. June 4 was the last day gas was sold or used. On June 12, BP
shut in the well. On June 13, BP sent notice to the lessors that it was
invoking the shut-in royalty clause, enclosing shut-in royalty checks, and
designating June 13 as the beginning of the shut-in period.132 The shut-in
royalty clause provided:
Where gas from any well or wells capable of producing gas . . . is not
sold or used during or after the primary term and this lease is not
otherwise maintained in effect, lessee may pay or tender as shut-in
royalty . . ., payable annually on or before the end of each twelve
month period during which such gas is not sold or used and this lease
is not otherwise maintained in force, and if such shut-in royalty is so
paid or tendered and while lessee’s right to pay or tender same is
accruing, it shall be considered that gas is being produced in paying
quantities, and this lease shall remain in force during each twelve-
month period for which shut-in royalty is so paid or tendered.”133
Red Deer sued BP for lease termination. The question submitted to the
jury was as follows: “Was the Vera Murray #11 well incapable of produc-
ing in paying quantities when it was shut-in on June 13, 2012?”134 The
jury answered “yes” and judgment was entered terminating BP’s lease.135
It was undisputed that the sixty-day cessation-of-production clause did
not apply. Therefore, the shut-in royalty clause was the only savings
128. Id. at 486.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 486–87.
131. 526 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2017).
132. Id. at 392.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 393.
135. Id.
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clause that applied.136 The principal issue on appeal was to determine the
correct date to be used when determining whether or not the gas well was
capable of producing in paying quantities.137 This specific shut-in royalty
clause required that the well be “capable of producing gas”138 and “[i]n
many cases, [complying with the terms of the lease] means ‘it must be
capable of producing gas in paying quantities at the time it is shut-in.’”139
BP and Red Deer disputed the proper measuring date, but both appeared
to be focused on defining when the well was shut-in. The Texas Supreme
Court held that the critical measuring date was not the shut-in date, but,
as the plain language of the lease specified, the last date gas was “sold or
used.”140
That date was June 4, but the charge as submitted inquired as to June
13—the day after the day the well was shut-in. Thus, Red Deer failed to
obtain a finding that the well was incapable of production in paying quan-
tities on June 4.141 “Thus, Red Deer never obtained a finding that the
lease failed to produce in paying quantities before constructive produc-
tion took effect.”142 The jury’s answer to the question submitted could
not support a judgment terminating BP’s lease.143
BP did not preserve error by adequately raising this issue during the
charge conference, but preserved error on immateriality in post-verdict
motions. The supreme court held that the jury’s answer to the question
was immaterial and “[a] party need not object to an immaterial question
that should not have been submitted or cannot support a judgment to
preserve error.”144
The shut-in royalty clause considered in the Tracker case was almost
identical to the clause considered in this case, and the supreme court cited
Tracker with approval several times.145 However, Tracker concluded that
the measuring date was the time the well was shut-in. The supreme court
held that Tracker was distinguishable, but it appears that, on this point,
Tracker was virtually overruled.146 The definition of the phrase “capable
of production in paying quantities” laid out in Tracker was adopted in
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson147 in the context of the haben-
dum clause, and thus the supreme court in Anadarko did not need to
determine the measuring date in the shut-in context.148
136. Id. at 392.
137. Id. at 397.
138. Id. at 392.
139. Id. at 395 (quoting Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d
427, 432–33 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, 1993, no writ)).
140. Id. at 397–98.
141. Id. at 398.
142. Id. at 401.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 402.
145. See Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Expl., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ).
146. Red Deer Res., 526 S.W.3d at 398–401.
147. 94 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2002).
148. Red Deer Res., 526 S.W.3d at 398.
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The Anadarko case, in addressing production in paying quantities, de-
scribes the applicable test as whether the well will begin flowing, without
additional equipment or repair, when it is turned “on.”149 In Red Deer
Resources, the supreme court adds “[t]his determination of course, must
be made over a reasonable period of time under the circumstances.”150
This appears to be an intentional expansion of the relevant time from a
mere moment to a reasonable period of time, because the supreme court
cited to the same cases and the same pages previously cited one page
earlier in the opinion for the concept that profitability is to be measured
over a reasonable period of time.151 The supreme court was considering
Laddex at the same time it was deciding this case, which suggests that the
question or the accompanying instructions in this case should have made
reference to a reasonable period of time for determining the profitability
element of production in paying quantities.
Finally, the supreme court considered the import of a retroactive shut-
in royalty clause and appears to have given it the same effect as the indus-
try would probably expect.152 Once the measuring date is correctly deter-
mined, a one-year clock begins to run and, if a shut-in is tendered during
that one-year window, the lease will be preserved.153 “A retroactive shut-
in clause, like the one here, allows the producer to shut in a well up to
twelve months after production has ceased, with constructive production
relating back to the date the last gas was sold or used.”154
The case is a contract construction case, but it is significant because it
construes a very common form of shut-in royalty clause. It reviews the
special issue to be submitted, and the opinion seems to suggest that pro-
duction in paying quantities does not mean literally on the measuring
date, but may be further qualified by a reasonable period of time under
the circumstances. That is, profitability may not turn on the exact minute
a well is shut-in or on the last gas actually sold, but by reference to a
reasonable period of time.
C. TEXAS OUTFITTERS LTD. V. NICHOLSON
Texas Outfitters Ltd. v. Nicholson155 held that the executive rights
owner breached its duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing to the non-
executive owner by refusing to lease. The Carter family (Carter) owned
the surface and 50% of the mineral rights in the Derby Ranch in Frio
County, Texas. In 2002, Texas Outfitters Limited, LLC (Texas Outfitters)
purchased the surface, the executive rights to the Carter mineral estate,
and a 4.16% royalty interest in the Derby Ranch for $1.0 million. Carter
149. Anadarko Petroleum, 94 S.W.3d at 558.
150. Red Deer Res., 526 S.W.3d at 395 (citing BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 513
S.W.3d 476, 487 (Tex. 2017); Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1959)).
151. Id. at 394.
152. See id. at 398.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 534 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. granted).
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partially owner-financed the sale. In March 2010, Texas Outfitters re-
jected an offer to lease with a 22% royalty and a $450 per-acre bonus. In
June 2010, Texas Outfitters rejected an offer to lease with a 25% royalty
and $1,750 per-acre bonus. The owner of the other half of the mineral
estate accepted that offer. According to Carter, the Texas Outfitters
owner said “‘there would be no lease’ because he wanted to protect his
hunting business, which he had developed into a deer breeding
operation.”156
According to Carter, Carter believed an agreement was then reached
where Carter would forgive $263,000 on the note if Texas Outfitters
would execute the June 2010 mineral lease. According to Texas Outfit-
ters, Carter tried to buy back their executive rights in exchange for forgiv-
ing part of the note, but Texas Outfitters wanted Carter to include surface
protection provisions in the executive-rights deed, which Carter refused
to do. After two more offers of settlement, including an offer by Texas
Outfitters to sell back the ranch and mineral interests to Carter for $4.2
million, negotiations failed.157 Carter sued Texas Outfitters alleging it
breached its duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing by refusing to
lease. After Carter filed suit, Texas Outfitters received two more lease
offers, and then Texas Outfitters sold the surface and executive rights to a
third party for $4.5 million.158 “Following a bench trial, the trial court
awarded $867,654 in damages to the Carters.”159 There is nothing in the
opinion as to the calculation or amount of the damages (although it ap-
pears to equal the lost bonus on the June 2010 offer to lease), so the only
issue on appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence on breach of duty.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reviewed Texas jurisprudence re-
garding the executive owner’s duty to the non-executive. The executive’s
duty of good faith and fair dealing does not require the executive to
“grant priority to the non-executive’s interests.”160 When executing a
lease, the executive breaches its duty by “engag[ing] in acts of self-dealing
that unfairly diminish[ ] the value of the non-executive interest.”161 Al-
though an executive who refuses to lease generally will not exact a bene-
fit for itself that it will not acquire for the non-executive, the executive
can still breach its duty by refusing to lease.162 “An executive can breach
its duty to lease ‘[i]f the refusal is arbitrary or motivated by self-interest
to the non-executive’s detriment,’” even though the executive usually
gets the same benefit as the non-executive.163
The court of appeals held that the evidence supported the lower court’s
finding that Texas Outfitters breached its duty to Carter by refusing to
156. Id. at 69.
157. Id. at 69–70.
158. Id. at 70.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 71 (quoting KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 81 (Tex. 2015)).
161. Id. (quoting KCM Fin. LLC, 457 S.W.3d at 82).
162. Id. (citing Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of State, 352 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Tex. 2011)).
163. Id. (quoting Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 491).
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execute a lease to protect its pre-existing use of the surface.164 The court
rejected Texas Outfitters’ argument that it merely sought reasonable sur-
face protections by pointing out that all of the settlement proposals re-
quired Carter to convey a portion of their royalty interest, reduce the
note by $263,000, or accept deed restrictions that would have interfered
with future leases.165 Therefore, Texas Outfitters tried to protect its ex-
isting surface use with restrictions that would likely preclude a mineral
lease. Further, the court was not persuaded by Texas Outfitters’ argument
that it refused the leases to obtain higher bonuses that would also benefit
Carter. There was reasonable contrary evidence Texas Outfitters never
planned to lease the minerals and its actual motive was to exact a benefit
from Carter to Carter’s detriment by diminishing Carter’s royalty inter-
est, exacting a $263,000 reduction in the note, or by selling its mineral
interests back to Carter.166
The holding—that an executive rights owner can breach its duty of ut-
most good faith and fair dealing to the non-executive owner by refusing
to lease the minerals if the evidence shows that the refusal was arbitrary
or motivated by self-interest to the non-executive’s detriment—follows
recently established precedent. The significance of the case is that it pro-
vides an example of the facts that may support liability.
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS167
A. CARRIZO OIL & GAS, INC. V. BARROW-SHAVER RESOURCES CO.
Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Barrow-Shaver Resources Co.168 held that
“express written consent” to assign under a farmout agreement meant
“sole and absolute discretion” consent. Carrizo (Farmor) owned an oil
and gas lease and entered into farmout negotiations with BSR (Farmee)
to drill on the lease.169 An initial draft agreement’s consent-to-assign pro-
vision stated that Farmee could not assign its rights without Farmor’s con-
sent, which “shall not be unreasonably withheld.”170 After four drafts of
164. Id. at 79.
165. Id. at 78.
166. Id.
167. Other cases dealing with industry contracts include the following: Westport Oil &
Gas Co., L.P. v. Mecom, 514 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no. pet.) (lease
royalty clause and gas purchase agreement); Talisman Energy USA, Inc. v. Matrix
Petroleum, LLC, No. 04-15-00791-CV, 2016 WL 7379254 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec.
21, 2016, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (joint operating agreement and consent to drill); Chambers
v. San Augustine Cty. Appraisal Dist., 514 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no. pet.)
(pooling as a cross-conveyance); Noble Energy, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 532 S.W.3d 771
(Tex. 2017) (executory contracts in bankruptcy); Freeman v. Harleton Oil & Gas, Inc., 528
S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. filed) (recovery for overpayment under
letter agreement); Chieftain Expl. Co., Inc. v. Gastar Expl. Inc., No. 10-15-00037-CV, 2017
WL 3860357 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 30, 2017, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (pooling of NPRI);
Le-Norman Operating LLC v. Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 27 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) (PSA, data room, and electronic transactions).
168. 516 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, pet. filed).
169. Id. at 93.
170. Id.
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the agreement, the final draft deleted this language and provided that it
could not be assigned “without the express written consent of
[Farmor].”171 This provision was clearly negotiated. Farmor’s representa-
tive said that Farmor’s legal counsel insisted on deleting “which shall not
be unreasonably withheld,” but on three separate occasions Farmor’s rep-
resentative said Farmor would, in fact, consent. Farmee spent $22,000,000
drilling with no results, and then found a buyer for $28,000,000. Farmor
refused consent unless Farmee paid Farmor $5,000,000. Farmee refused,
lost the sale, and sued Farmor for $28,000,000 based on breach of contract
and fraud.172 At trial, Farmor contended that the evidence on the prior
negotiations was admissible, that the contract was unambiguous, and that
the court should rule for Farmor as a matter of law. The trial court held
the prior negotiations were inadmissible, admitted Farmee’s expert testi-
mony that under custom and practice in the industry “which shall not be
unreasonably withheld” was implied in “without consent,” and submitted
the case to a jury. Based on the verdict for Farmee, the court entered
judgment for Farmee in the amount of $28,000,000.173
Whether Farmor breached the contract hinged on the level of discre-
tion the agreement gave Farmor to withhold consent. Farmee argued that
because there was no express qualifier on “consent,” the final agreement
was silent as to the type of consent Farmor could exercise.174 Farmee ar-
gued that Farmor breached the contract by unreasonably withholding
consent, which contradicted industry custom requiring that consent be
reasonably granted. Farmor contended that the prior drafts established
unfettered discretion for Farmor to withhold consent.175
The Tyler Court of Appeals stated that it “may consider the facts and
circumstances surrounding a contract, including . . . objectively determi-
nable factors that give context to the parties’ transaction.”176 The court
reasoned that negotiations resulting in the deletion of the “unreasonably
withheld” language gave the agreement more context and were not
barred from admissibility by the parol evidence rule.177 “We hold that the
consent-to-assignment provision of the farmout agreement was not silent
when we are informed by its surrounding circumstances. The agreement
gave [Farmor] an unqualified right to refuse [Farmee’s] proposed assign-
ment.”178 This also meant that the unambiguous provision should have
been construed by the court as a matter of law.179 The judgment was re-
versed and rendered that Farmee take nothing.180
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 94.
174. Id. at 96.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 95–96.
177. Id. at 96.
178. Id. at 97.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 98.
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The opinion is silent as to whether “consent” could ever equal unquali-
fied consent or sole and absolute discretion consent. Rather, it expressly
turns on the parol evidence that this provision was not “silent,” but “in-
formed by its surrounding circumstances.” The opinion is also silent as to
whether the farmout agreement (which was only a few pages long) did, or
did not, include an entirety clause.
The court of appeals then considered whether Farmor committed fraud
by withholding consent after orally promising Farmee that it would not
unreasonably withhold consent. One of the elements of fraud is justifiable
reliance.181 The court held that Farmee’s “reliance is of no consequence
in light of the unambiguous term in the written contract that directly con-
tradicts the oral representation.”182 Farmee did not reasonably rely on
Farmor’s promise because “[a] written contract vitiates any reliance on
oral promises.”183
The significance of the case is the holding that earlier drafts of a con-
sent-to-assign provision are relevant to and admissible in determining the
scope of the final version of the consent-to-assign provision included in
the agreement. The case suggests that the word “consent” is not clear,
and therefore custom in the industry and prior negotiations may supply
the parties’ intent.
B. SAMSON EXPLORATION, LLC V. T.S. REED PROPERTIES, INC.
Samson Exploration, LLC v. T.S. Reed Properties, Inc.184 held that an
operator who formed two overlapping pooled units was obligated to pay
royalties to all pooled royalty owners out of the working interest share of
production in accordance with two separate contractual obligations.
Greatly simplified and modified, this case involved two pooled units.
Samson Exploration, LLC (Operator) was the operator for both units.
Operator drilled the DuJay #2 Well on the DuJay Lease, which produced
from a depth of 13,150 ft. to 13,176 ft. subsurface. Unit #2, as designated
for the DuJay #2 Well, included the DuJay Lease below 12,400 ft.185 Op-
erator then drilled the DuJay #3 Well, also on the DuJay Lease, which
produced from 12,197 ft. to 12,342 ft., and was therefore above Unit #2.
Unit #3, as designated for the DuJay #3 Well, included the DuJay Lease
and also the Reed Lease. Unit #3 was intended to cover the interval from
12,000 ft. down to 12,400 ft., but, by mistake, the unit designation in-
cluded all depths below 12,000 ft. Thus, the DuJay #2 Well was included
in both units. Operator never amended the unit designation for Unit #3 to
correct the alleged error. Operator paid the full royalty share to DuJay
and no royalties to Reed from the DuJay #2 Well. Reed contended that
Reed was entitled to a pooled royalty interest in production from the
181. Id. at 97.
182. Id. at 98.
183. Id.
184. 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017).
185. Id. at 771.
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DuJay #2 Well.186 Reed, who only owned half of the minerals in the tract
covered by the Reed Lease, also contended that the proportionate reduc-
tion clause in the Reed Lease did not operate to proportionally reduce
Reed’s royalty.187
Operator generally argued that (1) pooling effects a cross-conveyance
of title; (2) a pooled unit is not valid unless title is cross-conveyed; and (3)
title cannot be conveyed twice.188
In Texas, the cross-conveyance theory originated as a theory of con-
tractual intent in the context of joint or community leases. Though
we have never expressly considered whether cross-conveyance of ti-
tle may be contractually disclaimed, we have observed that mineral
owners may “protect [ ] their estates by express stipulation.” Under
the law in Texas, pooling implicates both contract and property
law—authority to pool emanates from contract but pooling agree-
ments give rise to interests in realty. The cross-conveyance theory of
title can be critical, even “outcome determinative” as to some issues,
such as venue . . . .189
The Texas Supreme Court chose to avoid discussing further the cross-
conveyance theory of title in pooling, and held that there is “no impedi-
ment to enforcing [Operator’s] obligations in this case under a contract
theory even if the pooling designation failed to effect a conveyance of
title.”190 The fact that there is an overlap did not excuse Operator from
paying royalties as a matter of contract. The supreme court avoided the
issue of cross-conveyance in pooling by focusing on the contract theory of
pooling.191 The opinion seems to ignore Operator’s argument. Other
cases hold that the pooling clause is strictly construed and that an at-
tempted pooling is void, if it is not accomplished in accordance with the
pooling clause. DuJay’s interest in Unit #2 royalties will apparently not be
reduced, so what interest was pooled?
Operator asserted the contractual defense of quasi-estoppel, a doctrine
which “applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to
maintain a position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from
which he accepted a benefit.”192 Operator provided evidence that Reed
accepted royalties that included only the DuJay Well #3 for years. How-
ever, “accepting an underpayment is not inconsistent with claiming an
entitlement to more,” and nothing suggested they “were accepting the
royalty payments on the third well in lieu of royalty payments on both the
second and the third.”193
186. Id. at 772.
187. Id. at 786.
188. Id. at 770, 775.
189. Id. at 777–78 (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 777 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.002 (West 2014); Hoover v. Wukasch, 254
S.W.2d 507 (Tex. 1953)).
191. Id. at 778.
192. Id. at 778 (citing Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 864
(Tex. 2000)).
193. Id.
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Operator asserted the contractual defense of a scrivener’s error to re-
form the unit based on mutual mistake.194 “Mutual mistake . . . requires
evidence showing both parties were acting under the same misunder-
standing regarding the same material fact.”195 However, the error of
overlapping depths was solely the mistake of Operator and Reed played
no role in that matter.196
Reed argued the damages awarded for breach of contract were errone-
ously reduced based on the proportionate reduction clause in the Reed
Lease.197 The granting clause of the Reed Lease stated “Lessor . . .
hereby leases exclusively to Lessee . . . all that certain land situated in
Jefferson County, Texas, and described in Exhibit A hereto which land is
herein sometimes referred to as ‘the land,’ ‘said land,’ or ‘the leased
premises.’”198 Exhibit A to the Reed Lease described multiple tracts and
the net mineral acres owned by Reed in the tract described, including the
tract later included in Unit #3. The proportionate reduction clause in the
Reed Lease authorized a reduction if the lease “covers a less interest in
the oil and gas in all or any part of the leased premises than the entire
undivided fee simple estate.”199 Reed argued the term “the leased prem-
ises” referred to Reed’s net mineral acreage and not the tract described.
Operator interpreted the lease to cover an undivided 50% interest in the
minerals, while Reed interpreted the lease to cover an undivided 100%
interest in the net mineral acres.200 “The dispositive question here is
whether the Reed lease ‘covers a less interest in the oil and gas in all or
any part of the leased premises than the entire undivided fee simple es-
tate.’”201 The supreme court found that the purpose of Exhibit A was to
“describe,” which “is to outline its boundaries so that it may be located
on the ground, and not to define the estate conveyed therein.”202 Based
on the lease’s use of “leased premises,” the supreme court found the pro-
portionate reduction clause was applied correctly and operated how it
ordinarily operates.203
Operator claimed it had a right to receive reimbursement from the
other Unit #2 royalty owners (DuJay) for its double payment of royalties,
because paying double has the practical effect of enlarging Unit #2.204
The Beaumont Court of Appeals found that the voluntary payment rule
prevented Operator from receiving reimbursement for its double pay-
ment, because “[m]oney voluntarily paid on a claim of right, with full
194. Id. at 779.
195. Id. (citing Smith-Gilbard v. Perry, 332 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011,
no pet.)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 786.
198. Id. at 788.
199. Id. at 787.
200. Id. at 789.
201. Id. at 788.
202. Id. at 789 (quoting Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. 1986)).
203. Id. at 790–91.
204. Id. at 779.
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knowledge of all the facts, in the absence of fraud, deception, duress, or
compulsion, cannot be recovered back merely because the party at the
time of payment was ignorant or mistook the law as to his liability.”205
Without further discussion of the voluntary payment rule, the Texas Su-
preme Court affirmed the holding because Operator created the overlap-
ping units on its own, never amended the units, never alleged acts of
fraud, and never alleged it was under duress or was compelled to pay
royalties.206 In summary, the supreme court ignored whatever argument
Operator was trying to make and just went with “you paid, you lose.”
Although the supreme court avoided directly considering the cross-
conveyance theory of pooling, it clearly held that pooling liabilities may
be based on contract, not title, and operators are free to obligate them-
selves to pay under royalty provisions that are inconsistent or increase the
operator’s liability. Although division orders were not an issue in this
case and perhaps Operator had no real theory for reimbursement, the
continuing trend to allocate all payment risk to operators under the “vol-
untary payment rule” threatens to destroy the efficacy of division orders
and the division order statute.
V. LITIGATION ISSUES207
A. CRAWFORD V. XTO ENERGY, INC.
Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc.208 held that Rule 39 does not require
joinder of interested parties if the only evidence of a dispute is a title
opinion. Mary Ruth Crawford owned 146 acres of land in Tarrant County,
Texas. In 1964, Mary Ruth conveyed 8.235 acres of the surface (Crawford
Tract) reserving the oil and gas. In 1984, Mary Ruth conveyed property
north and south of the Crawford Tract without reservation. Those tracts
were eventually subdivided into forty-four lots adjacent to the Crawford
Tract. In 2007, Mary Ruth granted an oil-and-gas lease with a pooling
clause on the Crawford Tract to XTO Energy, Inc. In 2009, XTO pooled
the Crawford lease with leases on the forty-four lots adjacent to the
Crawford Tract and other lands and leases. Each of the adjoining pooled
lot leases included a Mother Hubbard clause. In 2010, XTO commenced
205. Id. (citing BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. 2005)).
206. Id. at 780.
207. Other cases dealing with litigation issues include the following: Radcliffe v. Tidal
Petroleum, Inc., 521 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (evidence in
trespass to try title and bad faith trespass); Great N. Energy, Inc. v. Circle Ridge Prod.,
Inc., 528 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied) (trespass to try title);
Jinkins v. Jinkins, 522 S.W.3d 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (trespass
to try title); Town of Dish v. Atmos Energy Corp., 519 S.W3d 605 (Tex. 2017) (limitations
on claims for nuisance); Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos Pipeline, L.L.C., 872 F.3d 701 (5th Cir.
2017) (pipeline condemnation and due process); Fitzgerald v. Cadle Co., No. 12-16-00338-
CV, 2017 WL 4675513 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (royalty from
homestead exempt from turnover); Hardaway v. Nixon, 544 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2017, pet. filed) (constructive ouster).
208. 509 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. 2017).
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production from a well on the pooled unit.209 XTO’s title opinion as-
sumed the common law strip-and-gore doctrine applied, and therefore
the minerals in the Crawford Tract were owned by the adjoining lot own-
ers. XTO never paid Crawford, but did pay the lot owners even though
the record contained no evidence of conduct or statements by any of the
adjacent lot owners indicating their position on ownership of the Craw-
ford Tract. Crawford sued for breach of contract for XTO’s failure to
make royalty payments. “XTO filed a motion to abate and compel join-
der of the forty-four adjacent landowners, arguing that the adjacent land-
owners have or claim an interest in the Crawford Tract.”210 The trial
court granted the motion ordering joinder of the adjacent landowners
and eventually dismissed the case when Crawford failed to join the miss-
ing parties.211
The issue in this case was whether Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39
requires joinder of parties that have a potential claim of interest. The
Texas Supreme Court did not rule on the effect of the strip-and-gore doc-
trine, limiting the opinion to the joinder issue.212
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a)(2) states in part that:
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a
party in the action if . . . (2) he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of this claimed
interest.213
The supreme court held that “the adjacent landowners are not neces-
sary parties under Rule 39(a)(2) because they do not ‘claim [ ] an interest
relating to the subject of the action.’”214 According to the court, there
was no evidence that showed the adjacent landowners asserted ownership
of or demanded a royalty interest in the Crawford Tract minerals.215 Fur-
ther, none of the language in any of the adjacent landowners’ deeds or
leases indicate a claim of interest in the Crawford Tract minerals.216
The supreme court agreed that the adjacent landowners could claim
that the strip-and-gore doctrine gives them an interest; however, only
XTO has claimed that the adjacent owners have an interest.217 The su-
preme court stated that the landowners had never either directly or indi-
rectly claimed an interest; in order for the landowners to claim an
209. Id. at 908.
210. Id. at 909.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 912.
213. Id. at 911 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a)).
214. Id. at 912 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 913.
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interest, they have to do “something,” but instead they did nothing.218
The adjacent landowners did not claim an interest just because XTO
was paying them the Crawford Tract royalties. XTO decided on its own to
credit the royalties to the adjacent landowners, and there was no showing
that the adjacent landowners knew that they were receiving the royal-
ties.219 Although Rule 39(a)(2) does require joinder of persons in whose
absence complete relief cannot be accorded, the supreme court agreed
with Crawford that the only dispute was limited to the parties to the
lease—Crawford and XTO.220 Therefore, this case is distinguishable from
the line of cases holding that joinder of nonparty lessors is required in
lease title disputes.221 The supreme court noted that XTO could protect
itself from the risk of inconsistent obligations and future lawsuits by using
Rule 37 to bring in the adjacent landowners.222 Rule 37 allows the plain-
tiff or defendant to bring in proper parties to the suit.223
The limited significance of this case is that a title opinion is neither a
claim nor a dispute requiring joinder under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
39. The practical significance may be limited to determining which party
will have to bear the cost and expense of joining the interested parties,
which may turn on evidence of claims, or strategies for provoking claims.
B. PIERCE V. BLALACK
Pierce v. Blalack224 held that claims were correctly dismissed with
prejudice under Rule 39(a) in trespass to try title when plaintiff failed to
join necessary parties and further held that the claims could not be sev-
ered. The property at issue was a 366.7 acre tract in Gregg County, Texas
(Tract). For over 100 years, title to the Tract was apparently clear. Hus-
band owned the Tract in 1870 and bequeathed the Tract to Wife and
Daughter. In 1917, Hart claimed to be the sole heir of Wife and Daugh-
ter. Hart conveyed fee simple title to King and, in 1921, King obtained a
judgment which granted him possession of the Tract against Hart. In
1931, King also filed an affidavit claiming he had been in adverse posses-
sion of the Tract since 1918.225 Guttry claimed under King.226
Pierce believed Hart was not the sole heir of Wife and Daughter, and
that Pierce was entitled to some portion of the surface and minerals in the
Tract. On September 10, 2015, Pierce, as Plaintiff, sued Guttry in trespass
to try title, to quiet title in her name, and for a declaration setting aside
the conveyance unto King, King’s judgment, and King’s adverse posses-
sion claim (King’s title documents). The original petition included at-
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 911 n.4.
221. Id. at 912–13.
222. Id. at 914.
223. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 37).
224. 535 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no. pet.).
225. Id. at 38.
226. Id.
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tached documentation establishing that other unnamed persons and
entities owned surface, mineral, and easement interests in the Tract. A
hearing in October 2015 determined Guttry did not own an interest in the
Tract and the trial court instructed Pierce “to amend her petition to in-
clude all necessary persons and entities who would be adversely affected
by a determination of title.”227 On November 2, 2015, Pierce failed to
include all necessary parties, and was given ninety days to amend. “The
trial court specifically found that all persons currently claiming an interest
under the various conveyances attached to Pierce’s petition would be ad-
versely affected by a judgment in Pierce’s favor and, thus, were necessary
parties under [Texas Rules of Civil Procedure] Rule 39(a).”228 Pierce
filed her third through eighth amended petitions, but only included seven
defendants who only owned the surface. Pierce sought to sever the sur-
face and mineral estate claims, which was denied. She was given ninety
more days to amend. Her tenth amended petition included 117 defend-
ants and her twelfth included 172 defendants, but none were served.229
By September 2, 2016, Pierce had served only fifty-five defendants, and
she knew of easement holders that she apparently did not attempt to
name as parties. She filed a thirteenth amended petition, but again had
only served the same fifty-five defendants. On October 13, 2016, the court
dismissed Pierce’s claims with prejudice based on motions to dismiss filed
by several defendants.230 The issues here were whether the court properly
dismissed Pierce’s claims with prejudice under Rule 39(a) in trespass to
try title when Pierce failed to join the necessary parties, and whether she
was entitled to severance of the claims.
The Texarkana Court of Appeals found Rule 39(a) applies to trespass
to try title lawsuits231 and “is ‘broad’ and provides that a person who
‘claims an interest relating to the subject of the action’ must be joined if
‘disposition of the action in his absence, may . . . as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest.’”232 “Although Rule
39 provides for joinder in mandatory terms, ‘there is no arbitrary stan-
dard or precise formula for determining whether a particular person falls
within its provision.’”233
“Further, the Declaratory Judgment Act also mandates the joinder of
persons whose interests would be affected by the judgment.”234 Pierce
sought declaratory relief by arguing that King’s title documents should be
227. Id. at 38–39.
228. Id. at 39.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 40.
231. Id. (citing Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Longoria II), No. 04-15-00536-CV,
2016 WL 4013793, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 27, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.);
Kodiak Res., Inc. v. Smith, 361 S.W.3d 246, 248–49 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, no pet.);
Rogers Nat. Bank of Jefferson v. Pewitt, 231 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana
1950, writ ref’d)).
232. Id. at 41–42 (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a) (West)).
233. Id. at 41 (quoting Brown v. Snider Indus., LLP, 528 S.W.3d 620, 625 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2017, pet. denied)).
234. Id. at 40 (citing Kodiak, 361 S.W.3d at 249).
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set aside.235 “And, while a declaration is not binding on and does not
prejudice the rights of a person who is not a party to the proceeding, the
trial court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment if it ‘would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
proceeding.’”236
The court of appeals relied on Longoria I237 which upheld a Rule 39(a)
ruling for dismissal without prejudice. In Longoria I, the plaintiff sought
to clear title by obtaining a declaratory judgment that a 1924 partition
judgment was void.238 In that case, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
found that if it were to find in the plaintiff’s favor, it could diminish other
parties’ interests and damage any unnamed defendants’ ability to protect
its interest.239 The court of appeals found the facts of Longoria I to be
similar to Pierce, in which the court was asked to set aside King’s title
documents.240 “When the trial court’s decision about whether absent per-
sons should be joined as parties is guided by accepted legal rules and
principles, we will not disturb that decision.”241 Accordingly, the court
held the claims were correctly dismissed under Rule 39(a).242
Regarding severance, “Rule 41 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, ‘Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with
separately.’”243 A court properly utilizes severance when “(1) the contro-
versy involves more than one cause of action; (2) the severed claim is one
that could be asserted independently in a separate lawsuit; and (3) the
severed actions are not so interwoven with the other claims that they in-
volve the same facts and issues.”244 Here, Pierce argued her claims
against the surface owners should be severed from the mineral owners,
which would require her to join fewer defendants in the litigation. The
court of appeals reasoned that Pierce’s claims against all owners—surface
and minerals—depended on her ability to set aside King’s title docu-
ments, which involved both the surface and minerals. Thus, the claims
were “largely interwoven.”245 “Furthermore, the trial court determined,
correctly, that the severance could result in the possibility of inconsistent
verdicts, thereby undermining the controlling reasons for ordering a sev-
erance.”246 Accordingly, the court upheld the denial of the severance.
Finally, the court analyzed whether dismissal with prejudice was
235. Id.
236. Id. at 40–41 (quoting Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utils. Co., 549
S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tex. 1977) (quoting TEX. CIV. PROC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.008)).
237. Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Longoria I), 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2008, pet. denied).
238. Pierce, 535 S.W.3d at 42 (citing id. at 182).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. (quoting Longoria I, 255 S.W.3d at 180).
242. Id.
243. Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 41 (West)).
244. Id. (quoting Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1996)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 43.
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proper. The court relied on Longoria II,247 “which involved similar facts
as in Longoria I, but resulted in dismissal with prejudice.” Here, Pierce
was given plenty of opportunities to amend her pleadings and she drafted
thirteen insufficient pleadings.248 Accordingly, the dismissal with
prejudice was proper.249 Neither Longoria I nor Pierce considered Rule
39(b).250
The significance of this case is the court’s discussion of Rule 39(a) and
Rule 41 in the context of litigation involving title to the mineral estate. In
summary, it appears that surface, mineral, and easement owners must all
be joined under Rule 39(a), if, as a practical matter, disposition of the
action in a party’s absence may impair or impede another party’s ability
to protect his interest.
C. EXXONMOBIL CORP. V. LAZY R RANCH, LP
ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, LP251 held that there is nothing
inherently undiscoverable about the possibility of contamination from oil
and gas operations and surface spills, and therefore the discovery rule
does not apply. ExxonMobil Corporation conducted oil and gas opera-
tions on the Lazy R Ranch for almost sixty years. Soon after ExxonMobil
sold its operations in 2008, the landowner retained a registered environ-
mental manager to investigate any possible contamination on the ranch.
In a report dated March 31, 2009, the environmental manager identified
four areas, previously under ExxonMobil’s control, affecting 1.2 acres on
the 20,000 acre ranch where hydrocarbon contamination exceeded levels
set by state law. He warned that there was a threat of groundwater con-
tamination.252 The landowner sued ExxonMobil for damages for
remediation that landowner estimated would cost $6.3 million, but land-
owner later amended to drop the damages claim to seek only a
mandatory injunction for remediation at whatever cost.253 According to
the landowner, the required remediation would necessitate the removal
of significant volumes of contaminated soil and decontamination of the
groundwater.254 ExxonMobil moved for summary judgment based on
limitations and on other grounds, and the trial court granted the
motion.255
“Generally, a cause of action accrues and limitations begin to run when
facts exist that authorize a claimant to seek judicial relief.”256 For sum-
247. Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (Longoria II), No. 04-15-00536-CV, 2016 WL
4013793, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 27, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
248. Pierce, 535 S.W.3d at 43.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 43 n.9.
251. 511 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2017).
252. Id. at 540.
253. Id. at 540–41.
254. Id. at 541.
255. Id. 541–42.
256. Id. at 542 (citing Sw. Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 721 (Tex.
2016); Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194, 202 (Tex. 2011)).
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mary judgment purposes, the environmental manager’s report established
that four ranch sites were contaminated as of March 2009. ExxonMobil
did not argue that someone else was responsible for the contamination,
but only that that the landowner’s deposition testimony showed that any
contamination occurred before 2005 at the earliest. The landowner had
testified that she had noticed oil spills on the Ranch for years. Exx-
onMobil presented additional evidence that two of the four sites were
contaminated before 2005. As for the other two sites, the evidence was
inconclusive as to whether the contamination occurred before or after
2005.257
Although the landowner invoked the discovery rule to defer the ac-
crual of the landowner’s claims and to delay commencement of the limi-
tations period, the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply the rule,
holding that there was nothing inherently undiscoverable about the possi-
bility of contamination that kept the landowner from employing the ex-
pert sooner.258 The supreme court affirmed summary judgment as to the
two long-abandoned sites and reversed and remanded as to the other two
sites.259
Under Texas law, recovery of damages for a permanent injury to real
property is limited to the difference in value before and after the in-
jury.260 “Even if the injury is temporary, the cost to repair the injury can-
not be recovered when it exceeds the land’s loss in value due to the
injury” (the economic feasibility exception).261 Whether a landowner can
sue for an injunction requiring an operator to perform remediation to
prevent further contamination when the cost of remediation would ex-
ceed the value of the land, thus circumventing the economic feasibility
exception, appeared to be a significant issue in the case and attracted
several amicus briefs. The supreme court refused to consider the issue
because it was not addressed in ExxonMobil’s motion for summary
judgment.262
The significance of this case is the holding that there is nothing inher-
ently undiscoverable about the possibility of contamination and surface
spills from oil and gas operations, and therefore the discovery rule does
not apply.
D. CASH V. KING
Cash v. King263 held that attorney’s fees are recoverable under the De-
257. Id. at 544.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 545–46.
260. Id. at 541 (citing Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (E. Tex.), L.P., 449
S.W.3d 474, 478–79, 483 (Tex. 2014)).
261. Id. (citing J & D Towing, LLC v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649, 656 n.27
(Tex. 2016)).
262. Id. at 545–46.
263. No. 04-16-00700-CV, 2017 WL 3701781 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 23, 2017,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
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claratory Judgment Act in a suit over title to a leased mineral estate. De-
cedent died intestate with her three children as her only heirs at law. On
the date of death, Decedent owned real property in Karnes County. One
child qualified as Administrator and elected to pursue certain claims ow-
ing to the estate. The other two children (Children) elected not to finance
that litigation, and they each executed assignments to the Administrator
conveying whatever they were entitled to receive from the Estate “other
than that already received.”264 The Children’s interest in the mineral es-
tate was subject to outstanding mineral leases. The Administrator exe-
cuted a mineral deed as “Independent Executor,” conveying the entire
mineral estate in the real property to the Administrator individually.265
The Children filed suit against the Administrator seeking a declaratory
judgment that the assignments they executed did not convey their inter-
ests in the mineral estate to the Administrator.266 Administrator sought a
declaration that the mineral deed was valid because the Children’s assign-
ments transferred their interests in the mineral estate.267
The first issue was whether the assignments included the Children’s in-
terests in the mineral estate or whether the assignments excepted that
interest with the words “other than already received.” The second issue
was whether the court properly awarded attorney’s fees to the
Children.268
The San Antonio Court of Appeals agreed with the Children’s con-
struction of the assignments. “[W]henever a person dies intestate, all of
his estate shall vest immediately in his heirs at law.”269 The court stated
that “vest” means to “give into the possession or discretion of some per-
son or authority.”270 Further, the phrase “already received” means to
“take possession or delivery of” prior to a specified time.271 When the
Decedent died intestate, the Children’s interests in all of the estate assets
immediately vested. Using the plain meaning of the language used in the
assignment, the court of appeals reasoned that interests “already re-
ceived” would include the mineral estate before the Children executed
the assignments to the Administrator.272 Therefore, the Children did not
assign their interests in the mineral estate to the Administrator because it
was “already received” under the terms of the assignment at the time of
Decedent’s death. Thus, the Administrator’s conveyance of the mineral
estate to himself was void.273




268. Id. at *3.
269. Id. at *2 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (West) repealed by Acts 2009, 81st




272. Id. at *3.
273. Id.
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Attorney’s fees are generally not available in trespass-to-try-title ac-
tions, which is generally the only method for establishing ownership or
title to real property.274 However, “a claimant is not required to bring a
trespass-to-try-title action when the action is for relief that pertains to a
nonpossessory interest.”275 Because there were “outstanding mineral
leases covering the disputed mineral estate,” the Children only had a
nonpossessory interest in the mineral estate.276 Therefore, they were not
required to bring a trespass-to-try-title action, and the court properly
awarded attorney’s fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act.277
The significance of the case is the holding that trespass-to-try-title ac-
tions are not necessary when the action is for relief that pertains to a
nonpossessory interest.
VI. REGULATION ISSUES278
A. RING ENERGY V. TREY RESOURCES, INC.
Ring Energy v. Trey Resources, Inc.279 held that pre-injury injunctive
relief challenging the injection of fluids into an injection well permitted
by the Texas Railroad Commission (Commission) may be sought outside
of the Commission and in any county where the injury is threatened. Trey
Resources, Inc. (Trey) was conducting oil and gas operations in Andrews
County, Texas. Trey obtained nine permits from the Commission for the
operation of injection wells. Ring Energy, Inc. (Ring) operated several oil
wells that were near the injection wells.280 Before Trey began operating
the injection wells, Ring filed suit in Andrews County seeking an injunc-
tion against Trey’s operation of the injection wells.281 Ring sued under
Texas Natural Resources Code Section 85.321, which gives a property
owner a private cause of action if that owner’s property “may be dam-
aged” by waste.282 Ring claimed that Trey’s injection wells would cause
substantial damage to Ring’s mineral interest and would result in
waste.283
Trey filed a motion to dismiss Ring’s suit and maintained that the court
in Andrews County lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the suit
should have been filed in Travis County.284 Both Trey and Ring agreed
that Section 85.321 permitted an injured party to file suit in the county




277. Id. (citing Glover v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 187 S.W.3d 201, 210-11(Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2006, pet. denied)).
278. Another case dealing with regulation issues was Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mieka
Energy Corp., 259 F. Supp. 3d 556 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (joint venture interests as securities).
279. 546 S.W.3d 199 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).
280. Id. at 203.
281. Id.
282. Id. (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (West 2011)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
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party could file outside Travis County.285 Because the permit had not
been put into use and because no injury had occurred, Trey contended
that the suit should be viewed as an appeal of the issuance of the permit
by the Commission, and therefore Ring could only seek injunctive relief
in Travis County.286 Trey’s argument relied on Texas Natural Resources
Code Section 85.241, which provides that anyone who is affected by an
order of the Commission related to the waste of oil and gas may sue the
Commission in Travis County.287 Ring argued that Section 85.321 also
permits suits for equitable relief in any state court where venue is proper.
The trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.288
The El Paso Court of Appeals considered the language of Sections
85.241, 85.321, and 85.322. Section 85.241 provides that anyone “who is
affected by . . . orders of the commission relating to oil or gas and the
waste of oil or gas . . . may file suit against the commission” so long as
that suit is brought in Travis County.289 Section 85.321 permits suits in law
or equity by someone “who owns an interest in property or production
that may be damaged by another party,” if that other party is committing
waste.290 Section 85.322 states that no suit against the Commission “‘shall
impair or abridge or delay a cause of action for damages or other relief’
that a land owner, or producer might have for violation of a rule or order
of the Commission.”291
In analyzing the statutory language to determine legislative intent, the
court of appeals used several grammatical tools of interpretation, includ-
ing the use of “modal auxiliary verbs.”292 Additionally, the court looked
at the act as a complete document.293 After studying the text of the stat-
utes and finding no other adequate remedy, the court determined that the
“Legislature intended to allow pre-injury injunctive relief in the county
where the injury is threatened.”294
The significance of this case is the holding that the Commission does
not have exclusive or primary jurisdiction over suits seeking pre-injury
injunctive relief against the operation of injection wells.
B. FOREST OIL CORP. V. EL RUCIO LAND & CATTLE CO., INC.
Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co., Inc.295 held that the
Texas Railroad Commission (TRC) did not have exclusive or primary ju-
risdiction over claims for environmental contamination. Forest Oil Cor-
poration (Forest) held a mineral lease and operated a natural gas plant on
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 205 (citing TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.241 (West 2011)).
288. Id. at 203.
289. Id. at 205 (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.241 (West 2011)).
290. Id. at 206 (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (West 2011)).
291. Id. (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.322 (West 2011)).
292. Id. at 208.
293. Id. at 210.
294. Id. at 215.
295. 518 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. 2017).
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the McAllen Ranch. Various owners of the ranch (McAllen) sued Forest
alleging environmental contamination and improper disposal of hazard-
ous materials on the ranch.296 McAllen asserted multiple claims, includ-
ing trespass, negligence, negligence per se, fraud, assault, intentional
battery, and breach of contract.297 McAllen won in arbitration.298 While
the matter was pending, McAllen had also requested that the TRC inves-
tigate whether contamination had occurred on the ranch. The TRC
placed Forest in its voluntary Operator Cleanup Program. At the time the
opinion was issued, the TRC had approved some of Forest’s proposals,
but the TRC had not yet approved Forest’s proposed final remediation
plan.299 Forest sought to vacate the arbitration award because the TRC
had exclusive or primary jurisdiction over McAllen’s claims, precluding
the arbitration.300
The threshold question for exclusive jurisdiction is whether “the Legis-
lature gives the agency alone the authority to make the initial determina-
tion in a dispute.”301 If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, parties must
utilize all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the
agency’s action.302 Thus, if the TRC had exclusive jurisdiction, the arbi-
tration panel lacked jurisdiction to enter the award, and the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to confirm it.303 The Texas Supreme Court noted that
abrogation of common-law rights is disfavored and that legislative intent
to abrogate common-law rights must be clearly indicated.304 Forest iden-
tified multiple Texas statutes as examples of the legislature’s intent to
abrogate common-law rights.305 The supreme court stated that these stat-
utes allow the TRC to regulate and oversee environmental issues in oil
and gas production and operations; however, none of the statutes clearly
indicate legislative intent to abrogate or foreclose common-law rights.306
The supreme court then considered whether the TRC has primary ju-
risdiction over environmental contamination claims. Primary jurisdiction
is a prudential doctrine that resolves authority issues when both an
agency and the courts have the right to make an initial determination in a
dispute.307 Trial courts should allow an agency to make the initial deter-
mination when: “(1) an agency is typically staffed with experts trained in
handling the complex problems in the agency’s purview; and (2) great
benefit is derived from an agency’s uniformly interpreting its laws, rules,
296. Id. at 426.
297. Id. at 430.
298. Id. at 427.
299. Id. at 426.
300. Id. at 427.
301. Id. at 428 (quoting Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Tex. 2000)).
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. (citing Cash Am. Int’l Inc., 35 S.W.3d at 16).
305. Id. at 428–29 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 401.415(a) (West
2010); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.321, 91.101(a)(4), 91.1011, 91.602(a) (West2011);
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.131(a)(1) (West 2008)).
306. Id. at 429.
307. Id.
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and regulations, whereas courts and juries may reach different results
under similar fact situations.”308 The primary jurisdiction doctrine “does
not apply to claims that are inherently judicial in nature.”309 The supreme
court held that McAllen’s claims were all inherently judicial in nature.310
The supreme court also determined that “McAllen’s common-law
claims are not dependent on the standards of regulatory compliance.”311
Although the TRC may make determinations as to McAllen’s contamina-
tion claims, it cannot oust the court of jurisdiction to decide those
claims.312 Forest complained that this subjected Forest to the risk of
double liability: damages payable to McAllen (who could pocket the
money) and a TRC order to clean up the mess. The supreme court re-
sponded that Forest could manage its risk by complying with TRC stat-
utes and orders.313
The significance of this case is the holding that the TRC does not have
exclusive or primary jurisdiction over environmental claims.
C. ETC MARKETING, LTD. V. HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT
ETC Marketing, Ltd. v. Harris County Appraisal District314 held that
natural gas stored in Texas for future transportation and sale in interstate
commerce was subject to ad valorem taxation in Texas. ETC Marketing,
Ltd. (ETC), a natural gas marketer, conducted business in Texas and had
multiple employees and offices in the state. Its purpose was to buy and
sell natural gas for the interstate market. It bought principally from the
“Katy Hub,” a central delivery and distribution point for natural gas in
and out of Texas, and sold to out of state customers. ETC “immediately
entrusted” gas it purchased to its affiliate Houston Pipeline Company
(Houston), an intrastate pipeline company located wholly in Texas. Hous-
ton stored ETC’s gas for several months in the Bammel reservoir, which
Houston owned, in Harris County, Texas. This allowed ETC to market
and sell the gas at a more financially advantageous time. All of the gas
from ETC, others in the pipeline, and that which is already in storage is
commingled and segregated only by paper allocations. To maintain pres-
sure in the system, Houston maintains a permanent supply of “cushion
gas” in the reservoir. Houston paid ad valorem taxes on the cushion gas,
equipment, and property it owned in Harris County, including that re-
lated to the Bammel reservoir. Houston did not pay tax on stored gas
owned by marketers like ETC, and ETC did not pay tax. In 2009, the
Harris County Appraisal District (HCAD) appraised natural gas ETC
308. Id. at 429–30 (citing Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, 84 S.W.3d 212,
221 (Tex. 2002)).





313. Id. at 429.
314. 528 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2017).
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had purchased at the Katy Hub and stored with Houston in the Bammel
reservoir and assessed ETC ad valorem taxes.315 ETC challenged the as-
sessment arguing that the stored gas was in interstate commerce and ex-
empt from state ad valorem taxation.316
The case turned upon the Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution,
which governs the power to regulate interstate commerce.317 If a tax im-
plicates interstate commerce, the most recent test adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court for determining whether a state tax violates the Com-
merce Clause is set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.318 To
remain valid under the Commerce Clause, the ad valorem tax must: “(1)
apply to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) be
fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce; and
(4) be fairly related to the services provided by the state.”319 In addition
to this more recent precedent, the Texas Supreme Court assumed that the
older “in transit” test articulated in Minnesota v. Blasius320 has some con-
tinuing validity. If property is “in transit,” it is not taxable. However, if it
stopped, the purpose of the stoppage is critical to determining if the prop-
erty remained “in transit.”321 The supreme court concluded that the “in
transit” test was part of determining the substantial nexus.322
Despite the natural gas coming to rest in the Bammel reservoir and
HCAD’s arguments urging the supreme court to determine the gas did
not even implicate interstate commerce, the supreme court followed Ma-
ryland v. Louisiana, which states that “gas crossing a state line at any
stage of its movement to the ultimate consumer is in interstate commerce
during the entire journey.”323 Thus, ETC’s gas was in interstate
commerce.324
A majority of the analysis focused on the substantial nexus prong of
the Complete Auto test. First, concentrating on what is actually taxed by
HCAD—the natural gas itself—the supreme court determined the scope
of the inquiry turned on the link between the natural gas and the jurisdic-
tion taxing the property rather than whether ETC was located within the
taxing jurisdiction.325 The natural gas was located in Harris County for a
substantial period of time because it was stored in the Bammel reservoir.
The link between the property and the state is the relevant consideration
for the “nexus” inquiry.326
315. Id. at 73.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 75 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3).
318. Id. at 76 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)).
319. Id. (citing D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 30 (1988), Complete Auto,
430 U.S. at 288)).
320. 290 U.S. 1, 9 (1933).
321. ETC Mktg., Ltd., 528 S.W.3d at 76.
322. Id. at 77 (citing Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mtkg. Co. v. Nueces Cty. Appraisal
Dist., 876 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Tex. 1994)).
323. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754–55 (1981)).
324. Id. at 78.
325. Id. at 78–85.
326. Id. at 79.
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Second, the supreme court considered whether there was “continuity
of transit,” because the natural gas comes to a stop for a period of time in
the Bammel reservoir and then resumes its journey.327 Because the natu-
ral gas was not held in the Bammel reservoir for some purpose related to
the continuation of the journey (i.e., a temporary stop), but rather for the
pleasure of the owner in timing the supply and demand of the natural gas
market, the supreme court held that the transit stopped in Harris
County.328
Third, the “fairly apportioned” prong of the Complete Auto test is satis-
fied if the ad valorem tax is “internally and externally consistent.”329 Be-
cause the property is taxed based upon its location within a taxing unit on
a certain day of the year, the supreme court determined that it did not
create a greater burden on property in transit than on property not in
transit within the taxing unit. The property can only be in one place at
one time; therefore, the natural gas would not be taxed multiple times in
different jurisdictions while it was being held in the Bammel reservoir.330
This path of analysis also led the supreme court to conclude that the ad
valorem tax was not discriminatory and that it treats the property in
transit identically to the property within the taxing unit that is station-
ary.331 Last, the supreme court held that the ad valorem tax helped pay
for community services, like police and fire protection, which benefit
ETC’s stored natural gas because such services will protect the property if
the need arises.332
The holding does not constitute blanket approval of any taxation of
stored natural gas, but nondiscriminatory taxation of surplus gas held in
storage without a destination for future resale does not violate the Com-
merce Clause.
VII. CONCLUSION
Title and conveyancing cases are frequently focused on document con-
struction and have limited effect as precedents. Wenske v. Ealy333 is far
more significant, because it attempts to summarize and explain how
courts are to analyze documents to find the elusive “intent of the parties.”
The trend of the decisions for years has been quite pronounced that rules
of construction are not favored and that courts should search for intent
within the four corners of the document. The corollary of that thesis is
that documents should be enforced as written, and the courts should not
create provisions that do not exist. The dissent in Wenske is correct that
there is no language in the deed that would subject Grantor’s interest to
bearing any part of the outstanding NPRI. However, the majority, in-
327. Id. at 79–80.
328. Id. at 84.
329. Id. at 86 (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989)).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 87.
332. Id. at 88.
333. 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017).
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formed by the nuances of oil and gas law, determined that the parties
intended otherwise. This is the close question that divided the supreme
court. Were they deciding what the deed said or what the parties to the
deed probably meant, which would be colored by the supreme court’s
views of what the parties should have meant? It was not helpful for the
supreme court to suggest that “[g]oing forward, drafters of deeds should
endeavor to plainly express the contracting parties’ intent within the four
corners of the instrument they execute.”334 Drafters of deeds have been
trying to do that for over one hundred years. Precedent still matters to
define how “intent” should be expressed, or every deed will be litigated.
Those cases which address fundamental property rights will be of con-
tinuing significance. Lightning Oil v. Anadarko335 determined the broad
outlines of the surface owner’s rights in the subsurface. It seems likely
that the Accommodation Doctrine will continue to expand to resolve
competing cotenant interests, both surface and subsurface. At this mo-
ment, XTO v. Goodwin336 is a petition-filed case that seems likely to
cause a stir, whether or not the supreme court takes it up. It clearly takes
on subsurface trespass issues the supreme court has been avoiding, raises
questions for allocation wells, and raises questions about the efficacy of
division orders. The voluntary payment rule really has no place in resolv-
ing issues when payments are made pursuant to division orders. Division
orders are essentially an executory accord. Everyone wants payments to
be made, any disputes will be raised later, and if not raised timely, will be
barred. There is no reason why the payor under the division order statute
should assume or be burdened with extra risk. To hold otherwise will de-
feat the purpose of the statute and result in more suspended payments.
The most important cases on lease and leasing issues in this Survey
period confirmed that “reasonable time” in the context of production in
paying quantities will essentially always be a fact question, and that the
date for determining whether a well is capable of producing in paying
quantities under a shut-in royalty clause is the last date gas was sold or
used (but again measured over a “reasonable time”).337 The Survey pe-
riod also generated a case that is the first example to show that there are
facts so bad that a complete refusal to lease may be the basis for liability
owed by the executive to the non-executive.338
Although raised in a petition filed case, if “consent” does not have a
fixed meaning (sole and absolute discretion or which will not be unrea-
sonably witheld), then there are many industry contracts that are at risk
for not having adequately defined the form of consent the parties in-
334. Id. at 798.
335. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017).
336. XTO Energy, Inc. v. Goodwin, No. 12-16-00068-CV, 2017 WL 4675136 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Oct. 18, 2017, pet. filed).
337. See BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Laddex, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 476, 482 (Tex. 2017); BP Am.
Prod. Co. v. Red Deer Res., LLC, 526 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2017).
338. See Texas Outfitters Ltd. v. Nicholson, 534 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2017, pet. filed).
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tended.339 Lease pooling in Texas continues to challenge oil and gas law-
yers and jurists to better define the fundamental property and contract
rights of the parties. Samson v. Reed340 does not help very much, but will
certainly make life more difficult for operators. The supreme court should
have addressed the fundamental question: what is a pooling? Instead, it
imposed liability because a designation of unit was filed. If an unautho-
rized pooling does not bind lessor, why would it bind lessee?
Because title issues may have originated very long ago and the number
of theoretically interested parties may have exploded over the decades,
the questions of who must be joined and the party who must bear the cost
and risk of joinder may be of great significance. It seems likely that the
current cases confirm that most potential owners must be joined, and
generally the burden will fall on the plaintiff.341 The trend to limit the
Discovery Rule continues with the supreme court’s refusal in Exx-
onMobil v. Lazy R Ranch to apply the Discovery Rule to contamination
cases originating on the surface or from operations that are visible on the
surface.342 Because limitations on the Discovery Rule are categorical, this
should limit many untimely claims.
The well-established limit on the jurisdiction of the Texas Railroad
Commission and the sometimes concurrent jurisdiction of the courts was
affirmed during this Survey period.343 Simplified, ad valorem taxation of
gas in storage probably comes down to whether the gas is clearly in
transit or has stopped without a destination outside of Texas.344
339. See Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Barrow-Shaver Res. Co., 516 S.W.3d 89 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2017, pet. filed).
340. Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017).
341. See Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc., 509 S.W.3d 906, 912 (Tex. 2017); Pierce v.
Blalack, 535 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.).
342. ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, LP, 511 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2017).
343. See Ring Energy v. Trey Res., Inc., 546 S.W.3d 199 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no
pet.); Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co., 518 S.W.3d 422, 428–29 (Tex. 2017).
344. See ETC Mktg. Ltd. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 528 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2017).
